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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 . Does a claim for "wrongful pregnancy" resulting 
in the birth of a normal, healthy child as the result of an 
unsuccessful sterilization procedure performed by a physician 
give rise to a tort claim for damages under the laws of the 
State of Utah? 
2. In the event a tort claim for "wrongful pregnan-
cy" is recognized by the laws of the State of Utah, what is the 
appropriate measure of damages? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for "wrongful pregnancy" and is a 
case of first impression in Utah, The plaintiff/appellant filed 
an action in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah based upon the allegation that plaintiff was not given 
adequate advice by the defendant/respondent, Norman Nielson, 
M.D. (Dr. Nielson), concerning a sterilization procedure which 
she claimed had caused her damage. Dr. Nielson filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment claiming that Utah law does not allow an 
action for wrongful pregnancy; and, alternatively, if such an 
action is allowed, Utah law should not permit recovery of all of 
the damages claimed by the plaintiff. 
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The Federal Court requested the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah to exercise its discretion and answer the ques-
tions of law certified to it, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On March 28, 1983, defendant Norman Nielson, 
M.D. (Dr. Nielson) performed a tubal ligation procedure (a sev-
erance of the fallopian tubes for sterilization) on the plain-
tiff. 
2. During November of 1984, the plaintiff became 
pregnant and subsequently gave birth to a normal, healthy child 
on July 24, 1985. 
3. Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Nielson was 
negligent in the manner in which the surgical procedure was 
performed; she alleges that Dr. Nielson was negligent in not 
informing her that: 
a. The procedure was not "absolute in nature." 
b. Alternative sterilization procedures were 
available (i.e., hysterectomy) with varying success rates. 
4. Plaintiff asserts the following damage claims: 
a. Medical expenses incurred during plaintiff's 
pregnancy and the birth of the child; 
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b. Medical expenses incurred in having a hys-
terectomy performed subsequent to the birth of the child; 
c. "Emotional trauma" during and after the 
pregnancy because of her concerns that the child may inherit her 
psychiatric problems; 
d. Pain and suffering; and 
e. Costs of "rearing an unplanned child." 
5. Dr. Nielson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the grounds that the claim for "wrongful pregnancy" as a 
result of the birth of a normal, healthy child does not give 
rise to a tort claim as one of the essential elements of the 
tort, namely legally compensable damages is not present; alter-
natively, Dr. Nielson moved the Court for an Order establishing 
the measure of damages which would be allowed if the claim for 
"wrongful pregnancy" was legally recognized. 
6. The plaintiff resisted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and asserted that the claim of "wrongful pregnancy" 
should be recognized by the laws of the State of Utah and that 
all of the items of claimed damages set forth above should be 
recognized. 
7. The case was scheduled for trial commencing 
January 14, 1987; the trial date has been vacated by the Court 
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pending the action of the Utah Supreme Court on this Order of 
Certification. (Order of Certification to the Utah Supreme 
Court, KIV.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The plaintiff1s claim for wrongful pregnancy is barred 
by the provisions of §78-11-23 to 25, U.C.A., which has been 
referred to as the "Wrongful Life Act". 
An action in tort for damages for wrongful pregnancy 
should not be allowed where parents give birth to a normal, 
healthy child, as they have suffered no "legally compensable 
damage." 
Alternatively, should plaintiff's claim for wrongful 
pregnancy be recognized, Utah should adopt a rule which only 
allows damages associated with the pregnancy and child birth and 
does not allow damages for the costs of rearing a normal, 
healthy child. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED 
BY THE WRONGFUL LIFE ACT 
The Wrongful Life Act (the Act) provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
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"§78-11-23. Right to life — state policy. 
The legislature finds and declares it is 
the public policy of this state to encou-
rage all persons to respect right of life 
and all other persons, regardless of age, 
development, condition of dependency, 
including all handicapped persons and all 
unborn persons. 
§78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent 
birth not a defense. The failure... to 
prevent the live birth of a person...shall 
not be considered in awarding damages or 
child support... in any action." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It should be noted that the Brief of Appellant does not cite or 
otherwise refer to §78-11-25, U.C.A. which contains the specific 
language applicable to the facts of this case. Here, the plain-
tiff claims that Dr. Nielson was negligent in not informing her 
that the tubal ligation procedure for sterilization might not be 
absolute in nature and, that as a result of this, she became 
pregnant and gave birth to a normal, healthy child. This claim 
falls squarely within the type of claims which are prohibited by 
the Act, in that it is based upon an allegation of negligence 
which constituted the "failure... to prevent the live birth of a 
The Act was passed by the 1983 Utah Legislature and 
there are no cases construing the same. However, the language 
of the Act is plain and unambiguous and is not susceptible to 
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any interpretation that would allow the instant action to be 
maintained. As was set forth in the 3 Utah L.Rev. 483, 491 
(1986) ff[w]ith one swoop, the Act abolishes both wrongful birth 
and wrongful life as causes of action in Utah". 
POINT II 
THE BIRTH OF A NORMAL, HEALTHY 
CHILD DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO A 
"LEGALLY COMPENSABLE DAMAGE" 
CLAIM IN TORT 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on the 
precise issue before this Court. In the case of Szekeres v. 
Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986) an action was brought in 
tort and contract based upon a foiled tubal ligation procedure. 
The plaintiff gave birth to a normal baby girl. The Supreme 
Court of Nevada affirmed the District Courtfs order of dismissal 
of the tort claim on the ground that one of the essential ele-
ments of a tort, namely "legally compensable damages," was not 
present. The Court reasoned as follows: 
"...Today this Court decides that in Ne-
vada the birth of a normal child is not a 
civil wrong for which the Court will pro-
vide a remedy in the form of an action for 
damages. Even if the negligent or care-
less conduct are found to have contributed 
to the eventual birth of Erica, this event 
would not give rise to tort liability and 
negligence. The reason is that a negli-
-6-
gence action may not be maintained unless 
one has suffered injury or damage, Cannon 
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co,, 376 Mass, 3 
739, 374 NE.2d 582 (1978) and the birth of 
a normal, healthy child is not 'legally 
compensable damages1 in tort. Restatement 
(Second of Torts, §328A (1965)." 
The Nevada Supreme Court continued by quoting from Byrd v. Wes-
ley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215 699 P.2d 459, 468 (1985), which 
held: 
"We hold simply that under the public 
policy of this state, a parent cannot be 
said to be damaged by the birth of a nor-
mal, healthy child, and the parent may not 
recover because of the birth of such a 
child." 
Some courts have stated, and take for granted, that giving birth 
to a normal child is somehow injurious and damaging; but have 
only disagreed on the measure of damages. In response to this 
argument, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned: 
"We do not take the wrongness nor the 
injuriousness of the birth event for 
granted and say, to the contrary, that 
normal birth is not a wrong, it is a 
frightf. It is an event which, of itself, 
is not a legally compensable, injurious 
consequence, even if the birth is partial-
ly attributable to the negligent conduct 
of someone purporting to be able to pre-
vent the eventuality of child birth....Our 
refusal to recognize the birth of a nor-
mal, healthy child as a compensable wrong 
does not in any way interfere with a per-
son's ostensible right to avoid conception 
or, per Roe v. Wade, to abort the fetus in 
the first trimester. 
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Tort liability is part of a body of law 
which is directed toward the compensation 
of individuals for wrongs suffered within 
the scope of their legally recognized 
interests and where the law considers the 
compensation to be properly (and morally) 
required . . .ff 
Dr. Nielson submits that the reasoning of the Nevada 
and Kansas courts is inherently sound and should be adopted by 
this Court. Other courts which have reached different results 
do so only on the incorrect premise that giving birth to a nor-
mal, healthy, but unplanned child is a "wrong" for which damages 
should be awarded. 
The courts which allow a recovery in tort based upon 
circumstances similar to those before this Court state that the 
issues involved are indistinguishable from any other profession-
al negligence case; for example: 
"Analytically, such an action is indis-
tinguishable in an ordinary medical negli-
gence action where plaintiff alleges that 
a physician has breached a duty of care 
owed to him or her with resulting injur-
ious consequences..." Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic, 216 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 
1977). 
In response to this argument, the Nevada Supreme Court in 
Szekeres, supra, stated: 
"From our point of view, what is overlook-
ed in these decisions is the basic ques-
-8-
tion of just what is the damage or the 
1
 wrong1 to be legally redressed. A case 
involving the birth of a normal child is 
analytically distinguishable from an ordi-
nary medical negligence action, with its 
attendant 'resulting injurious consequenc-
es,1 such as death, disability or other 
adverse iatrogenic consequences; and it 
should not be facilely assumed that child 
birth is a fwrongT or the type of injur-
ious consequence for which society should, 
through its courts, as a matter of public 
policy, get reparation." 
Dr. Nielson recognizes that the position taken by the 
Nevada and Kansas courts is the minority view. (See the cases 
set forth in Byrd, supra.) However, the position is logically 
sound and embraces the public policy of this State as set forth 
in the Wrongful Life Act. 
POINT III 
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES SHOULD 
NOT INCLUDE THE PROJECTED COSTS 
OF REARING AND EDUCATING A 
NORMAL AND HEALTHY CHILD 
Should this Court hold that a tort claim for the birth 
of a normal, healthy child is allowed, it will be necessary to 
decide how to measure those damages. The courts which have 
allowed such claims have suggested primarily three views. In 
Byrd, supra, the court thoroughly discussed these three views 
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"The first view is that parents may recov-
er only those damages which occur as a 
result of pregnancy and birth, and may not 
recover the costs of rearing the child. 
[Citations omitted.] The second view 
allows parents to recover all damages and 
expenses mentioned above, but also includ-
es the costs of rearing a child. This is 
often called the ffull damage rule,1 and 
has been adopted by a minority of courts. 
[Citation omitted.] A third view, some-
times called the ordinary ftort benefit 
rule1 allows the recovery of all damages 
recovered in the above two views, but 
requires a deduction for the benefits that 
the parents will receive by virtue of 
having a normal, healthy child. [Cita-
tions omitted.]" 
The first view is the majority view and has been adopted by 
approximately 20 jurisdictions. In support of the majority 
position, the Alabama Court ruled in Boone v. Mullendore, 415 
S.2d 718 (Ala. 1982) stated: 
"The cornerstone of this denial is the 
idea that a normal, healthy life should 
not be the basis for a compensable wrong. 
To permit the parents to keep their child 
and shift the entire cost of its upbring-
ing to the negligent health care provider 
would result in a penalty wholly out of 
proportion to the culpability involved." 
A fundamental concept of our society is that a family that re-
ceives a new infant into their home receives much joy and happi-
ness in rearing that child to be an adult. The joy that the 
family receives far outweighs any economic loss that could be 
incurred by the parents and family members. 
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The Court in Wilber v. Kerr, 277 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 
568 (Ark. 1982) made a persuasive argument supporting the major-
ity position: 
"We are persuaded for several reasons to 
follow those courts which have declined to 
grant damages for the expenses of rearing 
a child. It is a question which mettles 
with the concept of life and the stability 
of the family unit. Litigation cannot 
answer every question. Every question 
cannot be answered in terms of dollars and 
cents. We are also convinced that damage 
to the child would be significant. That 
being an unwanted or 'emotional bastard' 
who will someday learn that its parents 
did not want it and, in fact, went to 
court fo force someone else to pay for its 
rearing will be harmful to that child. It 
will undermine society's need for a strong 
and healthy family relationship. 
The second view, or "full damage" rule, has little 
support and it appears that only Ohio currently adheres to the 
same; see Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 
(1976). 
The third view, referred to as the "tort benefits 
rule," would result in highly speculative assessments of dam-
ages. This approach would present insurmountable problems of 
proof under our present standards of proof of damages. Proof 
could undoubtedly be offered regarding the costs of care and 
maintenance of the child, although the standard of living and 
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the extent of education to be provided such child would undoubt-
edly require considerable conjecture and speculation by the 
trier of fact. See Troppi v. Scarf 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 
N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. App. 1971). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Reick v. Medical Pro-
tective Co., 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) succinctly summarized the 
reasons that a claim for rearing and educating a normal child 
should not be allowed, stating as follows: 
"To permit the parents to keep their child 
and shift the entire cost of its upbring-
ing to the physician who failed to deter-
mine or inform them of the fact of preg-
nancy would be to create a new category of 
surrogate parent. Every child1s smile, 
every bond of love and affection, every 
reason for parental pride in a child's 
achievements, every contribution by the 
child to the welfare and well-being of the 
family and parents, is to remain with the 
father and mother. For the most part, 
these are intangible benefits, but they 
are nontheless real. On the other hand, 
every financial cost or detriment—what 
the complaint terms 'hard money damages' — 
including the cost of food, clothing and 
education, would be shifted to the physi-
cian who allegedly failed to timely diag-
nose the fact of pregnancy. We hold that 
such result would be wholly out of propor-
tion to the culpability involved, and that 
the allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden upon physicians." 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff's claim is barred by the plain language 
of the Wrongful Life Act. Any attempt to exclude the claim from 
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the Act could only be done by ignoring its provisions and would 
fly squarely in the face of the public policy of the State. 
Additionally, this Court should hold simply that as a matter of 
public policy, a parent cannot be said to have sustained "legal-
ly compensable damages" as a result of the birth of a normal, 
healthy child, and thus no tort claim exists. 
Alternatively, should a claim for damages for wrongful 
pregnancy be allowed, Utah should not allow compensation for the 
costs of rearing and educating a normal, healthy child. 
Respectfully submitted this !2> ^ > day of May, 1987. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
CAROL CHAPMAN STRATTON, 
Plaintiff, 
— v s — 
NORMAN NIELSON, M.D., 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF CERTIFICATION TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Civil No, 86 C 0235S 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH: 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requests that the Utah Supreme Court exercise 
its discretion and answer certain questions of Utah law certified 
to it: 
I. The questions of law to be answered are as follows: 
1 . Does a claim for "wrongful pregnancy" resulting in the 
birth of a normal, healthy child as a result of an 
unsuccessful sterilization procedure performed by a 
physician give rise to a tort claim for damages under 
the laws of the State of Utah? 
2. In the event a tort claim for "wrongful pregnancy" is 
recognized by the laws of the State of Utah, what is 
the appropriate measure of damages? 
The questions of law certified as set forth above are 
controlling on the issue of liability, and on the issue of 
damages in the above entitled case which is pending before 
the Court. 
There appears to be no controlling Utah law based upon 
memoranda of authorities submitted by both parties. 
The following facts are relevant to the determination of 
the questions of law certified, show the nature of the 
controversy, the context in which the questions arose and 
the procedural steps by which the questions were framed: 
1. On March 28, 1983, defendant Norman Nielson, M.D. (Dr. 
Nielson) performed a tubal ligation procedure (a sever-
ance of the fallopian tubes for sterilization) on the 
plaintiff. 
2. During November of 1984, the plaintiff became pregnant 
and subsequently gave birth to a normal, healthy child 
on July 24, 1985. 
3. Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Nielson was 
negligent in the manner in which the surgical procedure 
was performed; she alleges that Dr. Nielson was 
negligent in not informing her that: 
a. The procedure was not "absolute in nature." 
b. Alternative sterilization procedures were available 
(i.e. hysterectomy) with varying success rates. 
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Plaintiff asserts the following damage claims: 
a. Medical expenses incurred during plaintiff's 
pregnancy and the birth of the child; 
b. Medical expenses incurred in having a hysterectomy 
performed subsequent to the birth of the child; 
c. "Emotional trauma" during and after the pregnancy 
because of her concerns that the child may inherit 
her psychiatric problems; 
d. Pain and suffering; and 
e. Costs of "rearing an unplanned child." 
Dr. Nielson filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that the claim for "wrongful pregnancy" as a 
result of the birth of a normal, healthy child does not 
give rise to a tort claim as one of the essential 
elements of the tort, namely legally compensable 
damages is not present; alternatively, Dr. Nielson 
moved the Court for an order establishing the measure 
of damages which would be allowed if the claim for 
"wrongful pregnancy" was legally recognized. 
The plaintiff resisted the motion for summary judgment 
and asserted that the claim of "wrongful pregnancy" 
should be recognized by the laws of the State of Utah 
and that all of the items of claimed damages set forth 
above should be recognized. 
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7. The case was scheduled for trial commencing January 14, 
1987; the trial date has been vacated by the Court 
pending the action of the Utah Supreme Court on this 
Order of Certification. 
V. The Court is of the view that the questions of law pre-
sented need to be resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in 
order for this Court to be able to enter correct rulings on 
the issues of liability and damages. 
DATED this zwjday of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
(LJL/^L^— 
David Sam 
United States District Judge 
Approved as to form and content 
DAY & B. '"^ 
At to rneys !fdr P la inJ^rf f 
By (\ : / ^ C ^ Q -yUkJ 
/ i P n i l l l p B,. She l j ^y 
KIPPA& CHRISTIAN, P .C. 
A t to rneys fo r Defendaot-
By_ 
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78-11-23. Right to life — State policy. 
The legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state 
to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other persons, 
regardless of age, development, condition or dependency, including all 
handicapped persons and all unborn persons. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 1. 
Law Reviews. — Utah Legislative Survey 
— 1983,1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 221. 
78-11-24. Act or omission preventing abortion not ac-
tionable. 
A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on 
behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for the act or omission of 
another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive 
but would have been aborted. 
History: L. 1983, ch. 167, § 2. tion and the Impact of Utah's Statutory 
Law Reviews. — Wrongful Birth and Breakwater, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 833. 
Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Ac-
78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a de-
fense. 
The failure or refusal of any person to prevent the live birth of a person 
shall not be a defense in any action, and shall not be considered in award-
ing damages or child support, or imposing a penalty, in any action. 
